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ABSTRACT
Consumer contracts typically include class arbitration waivers, or
clauses that prevent consumers from asserting class claims within
arbitration. By limiting consumers’ ability to hold businesses liable,
these waivers allow companies to continue illegal activity. Although
class arbitration waivers have the potential to impose significant harm
on consumers, commentators have yet to identify an adequate
solution. This Note examines commentators’ most commonly
proposed solution—legislation prohibiting class arbitration waivers. It
argues that prohibiting use of class arbitration waivers is an
insufficient solution. Supporters of such a response assume that class
arbitration would provide consumers with sufficient relief while
adequately protecting the rights of the parties involved. The rules
governing class arbitration, however, sacrifice important party rights,
suggesting that increased use of class arbitration might provide
consumers little relief. After demonstrating these shortcomings, this
Note then proposes three alternative solutions: lowering consumers’
arbitration costs, increasing administrative enforcement, and limiting
choice-of-law provisions within arbitration agreements.

INTRODUCTION
“If [mandatory arbitration] catches on, it could wipe out years of
1
progress in consumer protection.” That was one commentator’s
warning in the early 1990s, when companies began including
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provisions in consumer contracts requiring all disputes to be resolved
through arbitration. Unfortunately for consumers, such warnings fell
on deaf ears. Since the early 1990s mandatory arbitration has
2
gradually gained judicial acceptance. American companies
increasingly include certain remedy-stripping clauses within the
3
arbitration provisions of consumer contracts. One example is the
class arbitration waiver clause (class arbitration waiver or class
waiver), which precludes consumers from asserting a class claim
4
during arbitration. Class arbitration waivers prohibit consumers from
aggregating their claims and, in many instances, leave low-value
claimants without a remedy.
To understand the harsh and unfair implications of class waivers,
consider the story of Gene Dale and other Atlanta-area Comcast
Cable subscribers. In 2005, Dale alleged that Comcast had unlawfully
imposed on its subscribers franchise fees in excess of the amount
5
permitted by federal law. As a result, every three months, Dale
received a cable bill that was $0.66 higher than it otherwise should
6
have been. Over the four-year period that Dale had subscribed,
7
Comcast overcharged each subscriber by a total of $10.56, resulting
8
in a windfall to Comcast of nearly $640,000. Unfortunately for Dale,
recovering that fee would be difficult; in 2004, he unknowingly agreed
to arbitrate any claims against Comcast when he paid a bill that
9
contained a mandatory arbitration agreement. That bill included a
class arbitration waiver preventing subscribers from asserting any
10
claims on a consolidated basis. As a result, Dale could either spend

2. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s gradual acceptance of mandatory arbitration
agreements, see infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the right of remedy-stripping clauses, see infra notes 49–51 and
accompanying text.
4. For a more detailed explanation of the right of class arbitration waivers, see infra Part
I.B.
5. Brief of Appellants at 2, Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 0615516-C), 2006 WL 4126913.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Id.
8. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1220.
9. Id. at 6. Comcast inserted the arbitration agreements in envelopes containing
subscribers’ monthly bills. Id. The agreements provided that by paying the enclosed bill, the
subscriber agreed to arbitrate any future claims. Id.
10. Id.
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hundreds of dollars in arbitration and attorneys’ fees in hopes of
recovering $10.56 or simply pay the extra $0.66 every three months.
Although the Eleventh Circuit eventually held Comcast’s arbitration
12
agreement unconscionable, which allowed subscribers to assert a
class claim, many courts consider class waivers entirely enforceable
13
against consumers.
Not surprisingly, commentators have criticized courts adopting
the latter view. Several scholars have demonstrated that class waivers,
by rendering many valid claims economically unfeasible, have a
disastrous impact on consumers’ abilities to prevent businesses from
14
engaging in unfair and potentially illegal activities. Yet these
critiques fall short in one important respect—they fail to adequately
examine and identify potential solutions. Commentators summarily
conclude that legislation prohibiting class waivers is both necessary
and sufficient to provide low-value claimants adequate relief from
15
business misconduct. Extensive analysis shows that it is neither. This
Note examines the likely implications of such a legislative response
and demonstrates that legislation prohibiting class waivers is not a
viable solution. It then proposes three alternative solutions that
scholars should examine further to give consumers meaningful
protection in arbitral proceedings.
This Note begins with background information on class
arbitration waivers. Part I explains what these clauses are, why they
are detrimental to consumers, and why more and more companies
include them in their arbitration agreements. This Part also examines
how courts have treated class waivers. Part II discusses the response
of consumer advocates to class waivers and explores the solution that
commentators most often suggest—legislation prohibiting class
waivers. Part III explains why such legislation would not redress the
problems with arbitration. It examines the likelihood of legislative
action and explains that preventing businesses from using class
waivers would result in grossly unfair arbitral proceedings. Finally,

11. For a detailed discussion of the high costs of arbitration, see infra Part III.B.
12. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1217.
13. For an examination of various courts’ treatment of class waiver clauses, see infra Part
I.C.
14. For a summary of scholarly critiques of class waiver clauses, see infra notes 58–68 and
accompanying text.
15. For a summary of potential solutions identified by scholars thus far to class waiver
clauses, see infra Part II.
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Part IV identifies three alternative solutions to this problem: first,
courts, legislatures, or arbitration bodies could shift attorneys’ fees
and arbitration costs from consumers to defending companies;
second, legislatures could rely on administrative agencies to deter
business misconduct; third, Congress should limit choice-of-law
16
provisions in arbitration agreements.
I. CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS: HISTORY & USE
Predispute arbitration agreements are simply contracts between
17
two parties. Each party, by accepting the agreement, promises to
arbitrate, rather than litigate, any disputes that arise between them.
Like any contract, mandatory arbitration agreements contain specific
provisions detailing terms such as where the arbitral hearing will be
held, who will conduct the hearing, and how the parties will split fees
18
associated with the proceeding. By agreeing to the contract, the
consumer not only forgoes the right to assert a claim in court but also
agrees to be bound by any provision within the arbitration agreement.
Class arbitration waivers are an example of a remedy-stripping
19
provision typically included within predispute arbitration contracts.
Class waivers preclude consumers from asserting claims on a class

16. At the outset, it is necessary to note that arbitration and class arbitration waivers are
prevalent in a number of areas. As Professor Gilles points out, class waivers have the potential
to limit consumer, antitrust, securities, employment, and civil rights claims. Myriam Gilles,
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104
MICH. L. REV. 373, 413 (2005). Each type of claim raises unique issues, the examination of
which is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, this Note considers only the potential
implications on consumers and consumer claims. Consumer claims “encompass[] actions against
mortgage lenders, credit card companies, commercial banks, and others under truth in lending
and fair credit statutes; unreasonable charges claims against telecommunication carriers . . . ;
deceptive trade practices and false advertising claims against manufacturers and service
providers; and numerous other actions.” Id. at 414.
17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)
(recognizing that the Federal Arbitration Act “is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the
enforcement of private contractual agreements”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)
(“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . . An arbitration agreement is placed
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”).
18. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 131 (2006) (identifying clauses typically included within arbitration
agreements).
19. F. PAUL BLAND, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 5 (5th ed. 2007) (“The vast majority of arbitration clauses in use
in consumer contracts throughout the United States explicitly prohibit consumers from bringing
or participating in class actions.”).
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basis within arbitration. As this Part explains, class waivers have the
potential to impact a significant number of consumers because more
and more businesses are turning to these clauses to insulate
themselves from class claims. To understand how and why class
waivers developed, it is first necessary to understand the United
States’s dependence on arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
A. The Rise of Judicial Deference toward Arbitration Agreements
The acceptance of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism
in the United States dates back to the colonial period; merchants
routinely used arbitration to settle disputes as early as the
20
seventeenth century. Even then, proponents regarded arbitration as
not only faster and cheaper than litigation but also more private, less
21
adversarial, and fairer. With the advent of the railroad in the
nineteenth century, distant merchants incorporated arbitration
provisions into contracts to avoid what they considered to be biased
22
local forums. By the twentieth century, both businesses and
consumers believed arbitration agreements to be an effective way to
23
avoid the significant costs and delays associated with litigation.
Support for arbitration as an efficient method of conflict
24
resolution was not limited to the disputants themselves. In 1925,
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in an effort to
25
recognize and enforce private arbitration agreements. The FAA
requires courts to compel arbitration when the parties have formed a
26
valid agreement to arbitrate. Its passage reflected a congressional

20. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481 (1995).
21. Id. at 482.
22. Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions
Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
207, 215 (Winter/Spring 2004).
23. See 500 Trade Cases Are Arbitrated, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1924, at E3 (discussing the
low costs and lack of delay that parties to arbitration proceedings reported).
24. See Benson, supra note 20, at 481 (noting that, along with the federal government,
numerous states passed arbitration statutes in the 1920s).
25. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
26. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.”).
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belief that arbitration agreements were worth enforcing in an
27
increasingly transactional nation.
Acceptance of arbitration was not universal, however.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century judges remained skeptical of
28
the process’s supposed benefits. Courts considered arbitration a
lawless procedure in which arbitrators, unlike judges, were in no way
29
obligated to enforce the law. Disputants, the judiciary argued, could
30
not expect adequate relief in such an informal process. As a result,
courts at the time adhered to the doctrine of revocability, under
which courts considered agreements to arbitrate entirely rescindable
31
and routinely held them unenforceable. Even the enactment of the
FAA, Congress’s explicit attempt to force judges to accept arbitration
32
33
as a valid dispute mechanism, proved insufficient. For instance,
more than twenty-five years after the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme
34
Court in Wilko v. Swan invalidated an arbitration agreement
between a securities brokerage firm and its customer, openly
27. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (presenting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s belief
that arbitration agreements are valuable).
28. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate . . . . This jealousy . . . became firmly embedded in the English common law and was
adopted with it by the American courts.”); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 593, 619–20 (2005) (“[T]he law had been ambivalent about enforcing obligations
to participate in private dispute resolution at the expense of access to public processes. Judges
guarded their own monopoly power and regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.”).
29. See Resnik, supra note 28, at 620 (“Jurists found arbitration too flexible, too lawless,
and too informal when contrasted with adjudication, esteemed for its regulatory role in
monitoring adherence to national norms.”).
30. See, e.g., Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 380 (1868) (“[A] covenant to refer disputes to
arbitration is but an unprofitable covenant, affording only the shadow of relief at law, and
neither substance nor shadow in equity.”).
31. See Carrington & Castle, supra note 22, at 212 (“[T]he principle of revocability was
widely accepted by nineteenth century U.S. courts . . . .”); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1926) (describing
legislative attempts to overcome “the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are
revocable at will and are unenforceable”). The Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the doctrine
of revocability on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445,
451 (1874) (“[A man] may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration . . . . He
cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced,
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions . . . .”).
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Matthew Eisler, Note, Difficult, Duplicative and Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of
Class Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1900–01 (2007).
34. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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questioning the ability of arbitrators and the arbitration process to
35
effectively decide disputes.
In the 1980s the judiciary finally accepted arbitration as a valid
procedure. Courts, frustrated by the growing problems of litigation,
turned to arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution
36
mechanisms to efficiently and inexpensively resolve disputes. In a
host of decisions between 1983 and 1990, the Supreme Court readily
acknowledged that the FAA mandates arbitration when the parties
37
have a predispute agreement to arbitrate. In 1983, the Court
declared in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
38
Construction Corp. that the FAA signifies “a liberal federal policy
39
favoring arbitration agreements.” Whereas the Court viewed
40
arbitration with skepticism just thirty years earlier, it maintained in
Moses H. Cone that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral
41
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Just two years
42
later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
43
the Court not only acknowledged several advantages of arbitration
but also concluded that concerns over “potential complexity should
44
not suffice to ward off arbitration,” a conclusion quite different from
the one reached in Wilko. Finally, in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
45
Shearson/American Express, Inc. in 1989, the Court expressly
overruled the Wilko decision, declaring that it was improperly based
on the “outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration
46
proceedings.” Less than forty years after deeming predispute

35. Id. at 436–38.
36. See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59
ALB. L. REV. 847, 851–53 (1996) (noting that significant dissatisfaction with the court system
throughout the 1970s led judges to pursue alternative dispute resolution).
37. E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (“By its terms, the
[FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates
that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .”).
38. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
39. Id. at 24.
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25.
42. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
43. Id. at 628.
44. Id. at 633.
45. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
46. Id. at 481.
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arbitration agreements a violation of public policy, the Court fully
47
embraced arbitration as a valid mechanism for resolving disputes.
B. The Birth of Class Arbitration Waivers and the Criticism That
Followed
What, if any, impact the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1980s
had on the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer
48
transactions is unclear. What is clearer, however, is that the decisions
transformed the type of arbitration agreements used by businesses in
consumer transactions in the 1990s and 2000s. Corporations hoped
that the judiciary’s newfound fervor for arbitration agreements would
enable them to create agreements that reduced their overall liability
49
to consumers. As a result, drafters began incorporating into their
standard arbitration agreements what one commentator has termed
50
“remedy-stripping” clauses. For instance, arbitration agreements
have come to regularly include clauses limiting the type or amount of
damages available, the recoverability of attorneys’ fees, and the
51
length of statute of limitations periods. For consumers, such clauses
make it either more difficult to assert claims in the first place or less
likely that they will prevail on claims in arbitration. Either way, the
drafters decrease the chances of their corporate client being held
liable.
Companies seeking to evade class action litigation introduced the
class arbitration waiver as one such provision. Corporate defendants

47. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 225 (1995) (describing the Supreme Court’s
recognition that “[p]ublic policy no longer prohibits arbitration”).
48. Compare David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36
(“With the Court’s enthusiastic approval, pre-dispute arbitration clauses . . . have increasingly
found their way into standard form contracts of adhesion.”), and Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,
956 (1999) (“As a result of these expansive legal doctrines, arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in
consumer transactions today.”), with Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering”
to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (Winter/Spring 2004) (finding that just over one-third of the
average consumer transaction contracts contained an arbitration clause).
49. Gilles, supra note 16, at 396.
50. David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity,
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 53–59 (2003).
51. Id. at 57–58.
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52

detest class action litigation. The procedure aggregates plaintiffs’
claims, many of which plaintiffs could not bring without the class
53
action device. Class action litigation increases the chance that a
defendant will face substantial damage awards, so much so that
54
defendants may feel pressure to settle the claims. To combat these
problems, corporate attorneys in the 1990s urged their clients to
include within their arbitration agreements provisions preventing
55
consumers from asserting class claims. Their corporate clients
listened. Many consumer arbitration agreements began to contain a
clause providing that the consumer, by accepting the agreement,
56
waives the right to arbitrate on a class basis. These provisions leave
consumers in an untenable position: the arbitration agreement
forecloses use of the courtroom (and thus traditional class-action
57
litigation), while the class waiver bars class arbitration.
Consumer advocates have attacked this result as unfair. They
insist that the class device is often necessary to provide individual
58
consumers an adequate remedy. A consumer claim is typically a
negative value claim—that is, the consumer’s potential award is small
while the costs of asserting that claim are significant, resulting in an
52. E.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (“By aggregating hundreds, thousands, or even millions of
claims, the class action can make small claims viable and empower claimants in other ways.
Defendants dislike class actions for this reason.”).
53. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007) (“The class action process facilitates the
aggregation of numerous small claims in order to solve the collective action problem.”).
54. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (expressing
concern that a class action may “forc[e] . . . defendants to stake their companies on the outcome
of a single jury trial, or . . . to settle even if they have no legal liability”); Milton Handler, The
Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“[The class action device] utilizes the threat of
unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement . . . .”); Silver, supra note 52, at
1357–58 (discussing Chief Judge Richard Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook’s adoption of
arguments similar to Professor Handler’s).
55. Gilles, supra note 16, at 396.
56. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
Comcast’s class arbitration waiver, which provided that “[a]ll parties to the arbitration must be
individually named” and that there was “no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated or
litigated on a class-action or consolidated basis”).
57. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the
[agreement] creates a mandatory arbitration regime, a ban on class arbitration effectively
forecloses the use of any class-based mechanism.”).
58. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).
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59

economic loss to the consumer. Few consumers have the resources
or desire to seek relief when filing fees, administrative costs, and
attorneys’ fees exceed the potential award. As a result, consumers, no
matter how strong their claims may be, are unable to assert those
60
claims and must forgo any potential relief. Because class arbitration
waivers leave consumers with otherwise valid claims without relief,
the presumption that arbitration provides an effective dispute
61
resolution procedure is erroneous. Opponents of class waivers argue
that class proceedings avoid this inequitable result by aggregating the
62
claims of many consumers, thereby lowering the costs faced by each.
A related and perhaps more serious problem with class
arbitration waivers is that they potentially allow the drafting
63
corporation’s misconduct to go unpunished. When individual
consumers are unable to assert claims, companies are not held
64
accountable for their misconduct. Recall, for instance, the story of
65
Gene Dale and his fight to recover $10.56 from Comcast Cable. That
amount, over a four-year period, may seem insignificant, but Comcast
66
reaped nearly $640,000 as a result of its overcharging in Atlanta. If
the class waiver precludes Dale and his fellow subscribers from
recovering, Comcast has an incentive to continue overcharging,
especially if it can recover such a large sum of money. But the class
action device, by allowing individual consumers to aggregate their

59. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75, 85–88 (Winter/Spring 2004) (discussing numerous cases in which the consumers’
potential award was significantly outweighed by the costs of asserting the claim). For example,
one group of consumers was unable to assert a claim against a jewelry store that allegedly
overcharged its customers by $8.46 because the store used a class waiver clause. State ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 267 (W. Va. 2002). Professor Sternlight uses this and other
cases to suggest that, without the aid of the class action device, many consumers will be left
without adequate relief. Sternlight & Jensen, supra, at 86.
60. Leslie, supra note 53, at 76.
61. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982) (“If . . . an arbitration clause
may be used to insulate the drafter of an adhesive contract from any form of class proceeding,
effectively foreclosing many individual claims, it may well be oppressive and may defeat the
expectations of the nondrafting party.”), rev’d in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984).
62. Leslie, supra note 53, at 76.
63. Id. at 76–77.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text.
66. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007).
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claims, increases the company’s liability, making its misconduct
67
unprofitable. Because the class action procedure is in many instances
necessary to deter business misconduct, consumer advocates argue
that companies must be prevented from insulating themselves by
68
using a class arbitration waiver.
C. Judicial Deference to Class Arbitration Waivers?
The growth of class arbitration waivers and other remedystripping provisions has meant more consumers challenging the
viability of mandatory arbitration agreements. Although the Supreme
Court has readily embraced arbitration and predispute arbitration
69
70
agreements, it has also recognized limits to this judicial deference.
The Court has held that, though agreements to arbitrate are generally
enforceable, a court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based
on any common law contract defense, such as fraud or
71
unconscionability. In consumer challenges to class waivers, many
courts have used this authority to declare arbitration agreements (or
at least the class waivers within those agreements) unenforceable.
72
Courts generally rely on two doctrines to reach this result. Some
courts apply state unconscionability analysis to invalidate class
waivers. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit decided that Comcast’s
class waiver, if enforced, would effectively preclude subscribers of
73
Comcast cable from asserting low-value claims, “allow[ing] Comcast
74
to engage in unchecked market behavior that may be unlawful.”

67. Leslie, supra note 53, at 77.
68. E.g., Pub. Citizen, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the Rights of
Consumers, Employees, and Small Businesses, http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/
arbitration/articles.cfm?ID=7332 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (“Class actions are the only
effective remedy for wide-scale scams that rip off individual consumers . . . in small amounts.”).
69. See supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement
to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
71. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984).
72. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 399–400, 406–08 (describing two waves of challenges to
class arbitration waivers).
73. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
74. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1224.
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Thus, the court held that the class waiver was unconscionable. The
Ninth Circuit, also relying on unconscionability analysis, reached a
76
similar result in Ting v. AT&T. Other courts have held that class
arbitration waivers preclude consumers from vindicating their federal
77
statutory rights. The First Circuit, for example, noted that the
presumption that arbitration is an adequate mechanism for resolving
78
disputes fails when a consumer faces large arbitration costs. The
court held that because the class arbitration waiver at hand
significantly increased the costs faced by consumers, many plaintiffs
79
were left unable to vindicate their statutory rights. As a result, the
80
clause was unenforceable.
The problem for consumers is that a majority of jurisdictions
81
82
83
have reached a different conclusion. The First, Third, Fourth,
84
85
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits each enforce class waivers, at least in
86
certain circumstances. These courts generally point to both the
federal policy favoring arbitration and the FAA’s mandate that an
arbitration agreement be enforced in accordance with its terms when

75. Id.
76. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that AT&T’s class
waiver was unconscionable because it was unfairly one-sided).
77. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
Comcast’s class arbitration waiver would leave plaintiffs unable to vindicate their statutory
rights); Chun Wing Wong v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-73922, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49444, at
*12–13 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2006) (“Plaintiff’s damages are a paltry $19.74, hardly enough to
make arbitration worthwhile. Class actions were designed for situations just like this.
The . . . class action mechanism is essential to the effective vindication [of the plaintiff’s]
statutory cause of action.”).
78. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54–55.
79. Id. at 61.
80. Id. at 64.
81. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding a class waiver
clause).
82. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
83. Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (same).
84. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004)
(same).
85. Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (same).
86. No court has held that all class waiver clauses are enforceable. Rather, each circuit has
engaged in a contract-by-contract analysis and made a determination based upon the facts of
each case. The First Circuit, for instance, invalidated Comcast’s arbitration agreement on one
occasion, Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006), and enforced it on another,
Anderson, 500 F.3d at 72.
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87

upholding class waivers. Moreover, with few exceptions, most state
88
courts consider class waivers enforceable as well. Finally, some state
legislatures have taken it on themselves to declare class waivers
enforceable. In Utah, for example, creditors may include class
89
arbitration waivers within consumer credit contracts. It appears,
therefore, that in the majority of jurisdictions, courts will enforce class
waivers against consumers.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, there is
evidence that some members of the Roberts Court consider class
arbitration waivers enforceable. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
90
Bazzle, the Court faced an arbitration agreement that was
91
ambiguous as to whether or not class arbitration was precluded. The
plurality declared that when an arbitration agreement is ambiguous
regarding the availability of class arbitration, an arbitrator, as
92
opposed to a court, should interpret the agreement. Though the
plurality did not state that class waivers are enforceable, the decision
suggests that a business may include such a waiver in its arbitration
agreement. Otherwise, the plurality would have simply invalidated
the class waiver—there would have been no reason to require the
arbitrator to determine whether or not a contract contains a class
waiver. Indeed, Justice Stevens, who concurred in the plurality’s
93
judgment, opined during oral arguments in the case that, whatever
decision the Court reached, “all the arbitration agreements in the
94
future will prohibit class actions.” Coupled with the judicial and
legislative traction they have already gained, Bazzle suggests a bright
future for class arbitration waivers.

87. See, e.g., Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369 (explaining that the FAA and the federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements impose a heavy burden upon challenging consumers).
88. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 401 (describing California as the only state that regularly
finds class arbitration waivers unenforceable). Though California is still in the minority position,
it is no longer alone. See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006)
(severing a class arbitration waiver from a consumer arbitration agreement).
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-105 (Supp. 2007).
90. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 451.
92. Id. at 453.
93. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634), 2003 WL
1989562.
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II. HOW CONSUMER ADVOCATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS
Commentators have given class waivers significant attention
since businesses first began limiting consumers’ ability to assert
95
consolidated claims within arbitration. Nonetheless, courts mostly
have rejected arguments that class waivers should be held
96
unenforceable. And though judicial attitudes may change, there are
97
few indications that consumers will fare better in the near future. As
a result, attention should shift from criticism to reform.
Consumer advocates, however, have yet to put forth an adequate
solution to the problems presented by class waivers. Whereas their
critiques are extensive, weighing the costs of class waivers against any
potential benefits and examining at length the likely implications on
consumers, scholars’ proposed resolutions have been far less
complete. Of the commentators who have proposed solutions, most
have concluded that legislation barring the use of class waivers is the
98
best, and perhaps only, solution.
For example, consider the critiques offered by Professors Jean
Sternlight and Elizabeth Jensen. Professors Sternlight and Jensen
99
examine class waivers from public policy and efficiency perspectives.
They first address the argument that class arbitration waivers,
because they lower the costs faced by companies when resolving
disputes, actually benefit consumers because companies are able to
100
pass these savings to consumers by providing lower priced goods.
Sternlight and Jensen demonstrate that this argument is incomplete
using economic analysis that shows that consumers are unlikely to

95. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Part I.C.
97. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 375, 428 (concluding that class waiver clauses may
ultimately lead to the demise of the class action in part because “courts are likely to prove
hospitable to collective action waivers for as far as the eye can see”).
98. See, e.g., id. at 428 (explaining that, if courts continue to uphold arbitration agreements
containing class waiver clauses, legislation preventing companies from barring the use of
consolidated claims may be necessary).
99. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 92–99.
100. Id. at 92–93. Proponents of this argument suggest that subjecting businesses to class
arbitration will harm consumers because companies will raise prices to offset the higher disputeresolution costs. See, e.g., Steven J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90 (contending that arbitration
lowers a business’s “dispute-resolution costs” in part because of the ability to avoid class
actions).
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benefit from mandatory arbitration agreements and remedy-stripping
101
provisions such as class waivers. They then argue that even if class
waivers enabled companies to lower the price of consumer goods,
102
these provisions should not be enforced for public policy reasons.
Consumers tend to be overly optimistic, meaning that many would
gladly trade their ability to assert claims on a consolidated basis for
lower priced goods even though that right is potentially worth
103
significantly more than the difference in price. Further, Sternlight
and Jensen contend that class waivers should not be permitted
because of the important role of private litigation in the United
104
States. Eliminating consumers’ ability to consolidate claims would
pose a significant problem in a legal system that does not rely on
105
administrative enforcement to protect consumers.
Having concluded that businesses should not be able to use class
waivers to prevent consumers from asserting consolidated claims,
106
Professors Sternlight and Jensen argue that regulation is necessary.
Consumers can protect themselves from class waivers only by
107
litigating the matter in court. Although this case-by-case approach
108
has enabled some consumers to successfully challenge class waivers,
this approach unfairly places a heavy burden on the consumer, who
has to spend a significant amount of money to challenge the
109
arbitration agreement. Courts’ contract-by-contract analysis forces
many consumers to forgo their challenges as economically
110
unfeasible.
Professors Sternlight and Jensen next examine how to best
regulate the use of class waivers. This is where their argument—and
many similar scholarly critiques of class waivers—falls short. They
conclude:

101. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 94–95.
102. Id. at 96–99.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Id. at 98–99.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 99.
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of various circuit courts’ treatment of class waiver clauses, see supra
notes 72–80 and accompanying text.
109. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 100–01.
110. Id.
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An alternative to using a case-by-case approach would be for
Congress to prohibit companies from using arbitration clauses to
preclude class actions. If Congress thought such a general
prohibition too broad, it could at least prohibit the practice with
respect to arbitration agreements imposed on consumers or
employees. Such a legislative approach would have both costs and
benefits. Its primary advantage would be substantially reducing the
cost of challenging class action prohibitions, but it would also serve
other interests that are furthered by class actions, including the
courts’ interest in the efficient resolution of disputes and the public’s
111
interest in ensuring that the law is enforced.
112

Other than noting that states could adopt similar legislation, the
above quote is the article’s entire discussion of potential remedies.
Although the purpose of Professors Sternlight’s and Jensen’s
article was to shed light on the problems associated with class waivers
as opposed to identifying potential solutions, too many scholarly
113
critiques have concluded in the same casual manner. Commentators
have yet to examine the likely implications of legislation barring use
of class waivers. In short, their critiques have thus far failed to
adequately focus on a sufficient response to the problems presented
by class waivers.
III. WHY LEGISLATION BARRING THE USE OF CLASS ARBITRATION
WAIVERS IS AN INSUFFICIENT REMEDY
Legislation preventing businesses from including class waivers
within their arbitration agreements seems both a sensible and
effective solution. Thus it is no surprise that many commentators have
114
reached this result. Because consumers are unjustly prevented from
asserting claims on a class basis, a reasonable solution should allow
111. Id. at 101–02 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 102.
113. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 16, at 428 (“Congress . . . could pass legislation providing
that the procedures of Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may not be
waived . . . .”); Sternlight, supra note 58, at 121 (“Legislation will be needed to prevent
companies from using binding arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions entirely, to the
extent we decide it would be undesirable to allow companies to insulate themselves from class
actions . . . .”); Thomas Burch, Note, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer
Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1040 (2004) (“[O]ne
practical compromise would be to uphold the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, but allow state law
to determine whether the arbitration may proceed on a classwide basis.”).
114. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
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consolidated claims within arbitration. Legislation preventing
companies from using class waivers, the argument goes, would allow
consumers to consolidate their claims. As a result, low-value
claimants are able to seek relief, regardless of the amount of their
claims.
The problem with this argument is that it makes a number of
questionable assumptions. First, commentators assume that allowing
class claims in arbitration would provide consumers sufficient relief
while adequately protecting the rights of the parties involved. Second,
the argument assumes that businesses would continue to use
arbitration if consumers could consolidate their claims. This Part
concludes that class arbitration rules sacrifice important party rights
and that businesses may no longer use arbitration if subject to class
claims. Legislation prohibiting class waivers is therefore an
inadequate solution.
A. Will Legislators Answer Calls for Legislative Reform?
Assuming Congress or various state legislatures agreed that they
should eliminate class arbitration waivers, what steps could legislators
take toward a remedy? The Federal Arbitration Act presents a
significant hurdle to state legislation attempting to ban such clauses.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate
115
are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. The Supreme Court has held
that the FAA preempts any state law, whether legislatively or
116
judicially created, that suggests otherwise. Therefore, courts would
likely hold that federal law preempts any state legislation providing
consumers with a right to class arbitration or prohibiting companies
117
from including waiver clauses in arbitration agreements. Although
determining exactly when federal law would preempt state legislation
is beyond the scope of this Note, courts would probably invalidate the
type of state legislation that critics of class arbitration waivers
recommend.

115. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
116. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the [FAA],
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.”); see also Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the
Class Mechanism Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1715,
1721–24 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA’s preemptive effect).
117. Safi, supra note 116, at 1736.
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As for congressional action, Congress could amend the FAA to
prohibit class waivers. Congress could add a provision preventing
drafters from including class waivers within their arbitration
agreements or one declaring any such clause unenforceable. Such a
practical solution is unlikely; in the nearly two decades since
mandatory arbitration agreements emerged, Congress has yet to offer
118
consumers any form of protection.
In short, legislative reform is a possibility. State legislatures may
find a way to draft a statute so as to prohibit class arbitration waivers
without running afoul of the FAA. Congress might finally decide to
provide consumers relief from mandatory arbitration by prohibiting
waiver clauses in consumer contracts, at least in some circumstances.
But critics of these waivers have failed to recognize that the efficacy
of such reforms is outweighed by the remote possibility of their
enactment and enforcement.
B. Class Arbitration: A Flawed Procedure
Putting aside whether legislative reform is a possibility, it is not
at all clear that Congress could prohibit class arbitration waivers
without creating other, perhaps more serious, problems. Legislation
declaring these clauses unenforceable would have its benefits. This
bright-line approach would allow courts to avoid difficult, timeconsuming contract-by-contract analysis. Nonetheless, legislative
reform is an insufficient solution, primarily because it relies too much
on class arbitration to resolve consumer claims.
Though commentators blame class waivers for unjustly stripping
consumers of the ability to assert low-value claims, it is important to
note that these clauses foreclose only class arbitration. The
arbitration agreement itself, not the class waiver, prohibits class
119
action litigation (or any other court litigation). In other words,
consumers’ inability to bring low-value claims is the product of two
steps: first, the arbitration agreement, by forcing the consumer into
arbitration, prevents the consumer from participating in class action

118. See id. at 1717 & n.11 (discussing several unsuccessful attempts in Congress to protect
consumers from mandatory arbitration agreements).
119. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[T]he [agreement]
explicitly forbids only class arbitration, and not class actions. However, because the [agreement]
creates a mandatory arbitration regime, a ban on class arbitration effectively forecloses the use
of any class-based mechanism.”).
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litigation; second, the class waivers within the arbitration agreement
prevent the consumer from participating in class arbitration. The
distinction, though subtle, is important because legislative reform
rendering class arbitration waivers unenforceable would allow
consumers to take advantage only of class arbitration. So long as
companies continued to use arbitration agreements despite legislative
reform, class action litigation would remain unavailable to consumers
subject to a valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, the success of
legislative reform ultimately depends on the viability of class
120
arbitration as a dispute mechanism.
It is this reliance on class arbitration that dooms legislative
reform as a viable option. Though courts first recognized class
arbitration as a potential solution to the problem of mandatory
121
arbitration over twenty-five years ago,
class arbitration is a
122
relatively untested device. Opponents of class waivers assume that
making class arbitration available to consumers would effectively

120. Professor Sternlight has suggested that legislation might instead preclude both class
waiver clauses and class arbitration. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 125. Consumers would then be
able to use traditional class action litigation for class claims but would be required to arbitrate
any individual claims. Id. This approach, however, forces many claims that might otherwise be
resolved through arbitration into courtrooms. The federal policy favoring arbitration requires
courts to uphold parties’ commitments to arbitration. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d
1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982) (“One possible solution to this dilemma would be to hold that arbitration
agreements contained in contracts of adhesion may not operate to stay properly maintainable
class actions. The statutes and public policy supportive of arbitration require, however, that this
result be avoided if means are available to give expression to the basic arbitration commitment
of the parties.” (citations omitted)), rev’d in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984).
121. See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (“Where . . . gross unfairness would result from the
denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis, then an order structuring arbitration on
that basis would be justified.”).
122. See Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent
Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1677, 1717 (2005) (“[T]here have been no special class arbitration procedures
devised by Congress via the FAA or any other legislation.”). Indeed, during oral arguments in
Bazzle, Justice Ginsburg inquired whether there had ever been a class arbitration proceeding,
and counsel for Green Tree could identify only a few. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
94, at 13. Since the Bazzle decision, however, the prevalence of class arbitration has increased.
The American Arbitration Association, one of the leading arbitration providers in the United
States, has administered over one hundred class arbitrations. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Class
Action Cases, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (listing all class
arbitration proceedings AAA has administered or is currently administering).
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solve the problems presented by the clauses. Evaluation of class
arbitration, however, shows that assumption is at least premature and
likely misguided. Simply put, class arbitration is not capable of
resolving hundreds (perhaps thousands) of claims, all the while
adequately protecting the interests of absent class members and the
defendants. Moreover, increased use of class arbitration might
ultimately lead businesses to avoid using arbitration agreements
altogether, a result at odds with the United States’s “federal policy
124
favoring arbitration.”
1. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Class Arbitration
Rules Fail to Protect Consumers Asserting Class Claims. Following
125
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle, several major private
arbitration providers set forth rules governing use of class arbitration.
For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), a
private alternative dispute resolution provider, adopted its
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations just months after the
126
Bazzle decision. The AAA and other arbitration providers used
127
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model. In many
128
respects, the arbitration providers’ rules are identical to Rule 23.

123. See Sternlight, supra note 58, at 121–22 (contending that legislation precluding use of
class arbitration waivers would “allow[] suits to be brought by small claimants who otherwise
could not afford to sue” and “facilitate[] enforcement of laws”).
124. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
125. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (discussing Bazzle and its implications).
126. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28779 (explaining that the AAA’s rules were adopted in response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle).
127. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth several prerequisites to a class action,
describing the types of class actions maintainable, and presenting numerous procedural
protections for the parties to a class action), with JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
SERVS. (JAMS), JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES 2 (2005), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures.pdf (adopting similar
prerequisites and procedural protections and describing similar types of classes maintainable in
class arbitration), and SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS § 4(a) (Am.
Arbitration Ass’n 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (same).
128. For instance, JAMS, a large private arbitration and mediation provider, requires that a
class meet four prerequisites before it may be certified: the class must be “so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable”; there must be “questions of law or fact common to the
class”; “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or
defenses of the class”; and “the representative parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.” JAMS, supra note 127, at 2. These requirements are identical to the
prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (describing the prerequisites to a
class action).
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Regarding many important issues, however, the rules are either silent
or diverge significantly from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
raising serious questions as to the ability of class arbitration to
129
adequately resolve disputes. Though there are other examples, this
Section considers one—appellate review of certification decisions—at
length.
In 1998, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 23(f), which provides
the federal courts of appeals discretionary interlocutory review of a
130
lower court’s decision granting or denying class certification. That
rule was enacted in large part because of the significant impact a class
131
certification decision can have on the losing party. Before its
adoption, litigants dissatisfied with a lower court’s certification ruling
132
were generally barred from interlocutory review. In many instances,
however, the certification decision was dispositive of the claim: a
decision denying certification of a class action could serve as a death
133
knell to the plaintiffs’ claim, whereas an order granting certification
134
imposed significant pressure on the defendant to settle. The
Advisory Committee believed that, because of these concerns,
135
interlocutory appeal should be available in limited situations.
129. The rules governing discovery provide one example. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure generally do not limit defendants to deposing only the plaintiff. Instead, Rule 30
provides that the defendant may depose “any person.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Though some courts have limited discovery in class actions, see, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556–57 (1986) (precluding the defendant from pursuing discovery
from absent class members), class action litigation defendants are able to discover substantially
more than are class arbitration defendants. Class arbitration providers substantially limit the
ability of parties to gather information. For instance, JAMS allows parties to depose only one
person. JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 8–9 (2007), available
at http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/JAMS-comprehensive_arbitration_rules.pdf. It is not at
all clear how a company could defend a class arbitration suit while deposing only one person.
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
131. See id. advisory committee’s note (discussing the concerns which led to Rule 23(f)’s
enactment); see also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1552 (2000) (discussing the “potential significance of an
adverse class certification decision”).
132. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 131, at 1562 (discussing support for allowing
immediate appeal of class action certification decisions).
133. Id. at 1552.
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (“An order granting
certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”).
135. Id. Courts generally consider appellate review appropriate in three situations: when
“denial of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation,” when “grant of class

124

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:103

To provide consumers and businesses similar protection in class
arbitration proceedings, many arbitration providers incorporate the
136
right to interlocutory appeal provided for in Rule 23(f). The
problem, however, is that the rules fail to acknowledge the FAA’s
severe limitation on a court’s ability to modify an arbitral decision.
The FAA provides that arbitral decisions may be vacated only in a
limited number of circumstances, most importantly “where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
137
submitted was not made.” Courts have interpreted this limitation as
138
equivalent to a “manifest disregard of the law” standard, meaning
that a court may vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator
was aware of the governing legal principle but failed to apply it, and
the particular law ignored by the arbitrator was explicit and clearly
139
applicable. Lower court decisions granting or denying certification,
on the other hand, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which
permits reversal if the lower court’s decision was based “upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an
140
improper application of law to fact.” A dissatisfied party in an

status . . . put[s] considerable pressure on the defendant to settle,” and when “an appeal may
facilitate the development of the law.” Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35
(7th Cir. 1999).
136. See, e.g., JAMS, supra note 127, at 3 (“In the discretion of the Arbitrator, his or her
determinations with respect to the matter of Class Certification may be set forth in a partial
final award subject to immediate court review.”). Others provide a right to appeal only after the
class arbitration award has been issued, however. See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS, supra note 127, § 5(d) (“The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the
issuance of the Class Determination Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party
to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Class Determination
Award.”).
137. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
138. E.g., Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have
adopted a narrow ‘manifest disregard of the law’ exception under which a procedurally proper
arbitration award may be vacated.”); Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l
Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n award may be vacated if the arbitrator
demonstrates manifest disregard for the [law].”); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,
202 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n arbitration award may be vacated if it is in ‘manifest disregard of the
law.”).
139. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202. For a detailed analysis and critique of the manifest disregard
of the law standard as applied to arbitral decisions, see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and
Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 565–87 (2005).
140. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783
(1995)).
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arbitration proceeding therefore faces a much higher burden than a
dissatisfied court litigant, because a manifest disregard of the law
“means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the
141
law.”
The result seems inconsistent with the presumption that
arbitration adequately and fairly enforces the parties’ rights. To
illustrate, suppose two separate, yet identical, class actions are filed
against two different cell phone providers. One class files a class
action in a United States district court (because that cell phone
provider does not use mandatory arbitration agreements), whereas
the other class, because of a mandatory arbitration agreement, is
forced to use class arbitration. Suppose both the lower court and the
arbitrator misinterpret the applicable law and therefore
inappropriately certify the proposed classes. Under the abuse of
discretion standard, the appellate court can overturn the lower court’s
142
“errant conclusion of law.” But under the manifest disregard of the
law standard, the arbitrator must have committed more than mere
143
error or misunderstanding. Under these circumstances, it appears
that a court could not modify the arbitrator’s decision, despite the
arbitration providers’ rules suggesting otherwise.
That identical classes achieve different results merely because
one party files suit in court whereas the other is relegated to
arbitration is manifestly unfair and should raise serious concerns
regarding the ability of class arbitration to protect the parties to a
dispute. Some might argue that this result is a problem of arbitration
in general, because the manifest disregard of the law standard applies
to all arbitration decisions, not just those granting or denying class
144
certification. Although that may be the case, the problem is both
more apparent and more severe in the context of class arbitration,
given the broader impact of certification decisions. Though
arbitration providers appear to have recognized and addressed this
concern by granting the right to interlocutory appeal, the Rule 23(f)–

141. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2nd Cir. 1986)).
142. Newton, 259 F.3d at 165 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank,
55 F.3d at 783).
143. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202.
144. See generally Scodro, supra note 139 (examining the manifest disregard of the law
standard at length and offering a more appropriate alternative).
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like provisions fail to address the impact of the manifest disregard of
the law standard.
2. The Class Arbitration Rules Fail to Protect the Rights of the
Parties Involved.
The previous Section identified procedural
inadequacies of class arbitration proceedings and explained that,
although the arbitration providers’ rules appear to mimic those set
forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing
class arbitration fail to take into consideration the unique
characteristics of arbitration as set forth in the FAA. These and other
deficiencies raise significant due process concerns. Though it is well
settled that the Due Process Clause does not apply to private
145
arbitration,
the rise of class arbitration has led several
commentators to reexamine whether due process might actually play
146
a role in a limited number of arbitration proceedings. For instance,
in class arbitrations provided by JAMS, an arbitrator is permitted to
147
make a partial final award subject to immediate court review. Such
judicial involvement would apparently bring into play due process
considerations. Some therefore suggest that private arbitration
providers’ class arbitration procedures are subject to due process
148
requirements. Others believe that, regardless of the Due Process
Clause’s applicability to arbitration, AAA, JAMS, and other
arbitration providers must afford class members and defendants

145. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he state
action element of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration cases.”); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e do not find in private
arbitration proceedings the state action requisite for a constitutional due process claim.”);
Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that a private
arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are encompassed by the term ‘due process of
law’ cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint.”).
146. See, e.g., Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 239
(2006) (“Provider models of class arbitration also may involve state action . . . given that the role
of the court in class arbitration is increased beyond that involved in non-class arbitration, and
that judicial review of an arbitrator’s certification decisions potentially available under provider
models occurs in connection with a potential area of deprivation of constitutional rights.”); The
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 410, 418–19 (2003) (“Although
private arbitration is not generally subject to due process constraints because it does not involve
state action, binding absent class members to an arbitrator’s judgment would likely implicate
due process requirements of adequate notice and representation.” (footnote omitted)).
147. JAMS, supra note 127, at 2.
148. See, e.g., Buckner, supra note 146, at 247 (suggesting that, because an arbitrator cannot
be certain whether there will be judicial involvement during an arbitration proceeding,
arbitration providers’ rules should satisfy due process requirements).
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149

adequate due process protections. Arbitration providers apparently
150
agree, as many have self-imposed “due process protocols.” Before
legislators declare class arbitration waivers unenforceable, they
should be satisfied that class members receive adequate notice and
are adequately represented. Again, in many respects, the arbitration
providers’ rules fail to provide general fairness to the parties involved.
Selecting the arbitrator presents one potential problem. The right
to have a dispute resolved by a neutral decisionmaker is fundamental
151
to due process. Courts generally consider the neutrality of the
arbitrator an important factor when determining whether arbitration
152
agreements adequately protect the nondrafting party. To guarantee
their arbitrators’ neutrality, arbitration providers allow the parties to
153
a dispute to participate in selecting the arbitrator. In a proceeding
between an individual consumer and a company, these provisions
guarantee the arbitrator’s neutrality, or at least give consumers the
opportunity to protect themselves against a biased arbitrator, because
the consumer or the consumer’s attorney directly participates in the
selection process. But in a class proceeding, the arbitrator must be
selected before class certification, because it is the arbitrator’s job to
154
certify the class. As a result, class members are unable to participate
in the selection process, and there is no way for these members to
protect themselves against a biased arbitrator. Although the
requirement that the class representative adequately represent the
class members might provide some form of protection, that
155
requirement is insufficient. Because the class members have a right

149. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1766–67 (2006) (“Even if courts reject
mandating constitutional due process in class arbitrations through the state action doctrine, the
concerns for a fair process in class arbitrations are as significant, if not more, as they are in
judicial class actions . . . .”).
150. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 172.
151. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992).
152. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing an
arbitral decision in part because the agreement provided for neutral arbitrators).
153. See, e.g., JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PREDISPUTE CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/Consumer_Arbitration_Min_Std.pdf (“The arbitrator(s)
must be neutral and the consumer must have a reasonable opportunity to participate in the
process of choosing the arbitrator(s).”).
154. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003).
155. At that stage in the proceedings, there are no class members or even putative class
members to protect. An individual consumer (who may eventually become the class
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to an unbiased decisionmaker, and that right is protected in the
arbitration context by allowing the parties to choose the arbitrator,
class members who are bound by the ruling of an arbitrator they were
156
prevented from selecting are not protected against unfair rulings.
A similar problem concerns the class members’ near inability to
challenge the arbitrator’s determination that the class representatives
adequately represent the class. A class action judgment binds absent
class members only when those members have been adequately
157
represented. In a typical class action proceeding, absent class
members are given numerous opportunities to ensure the adequacy of
the representatives. For instance, Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides absent class members the ability to appeal
immediately a district court’s order granting or denying class
158
certification.
Moreover, when it becomes apparent that the
representative is inadequate after certification, some courts allow
class members to collaterally attack the district court’s adequacy
159
finding.
These same protections are not available in the class arbitration
setting. First, the strict manifest disregard of the law standard

representative) might select a particular arbitrator with the best of intentions, believing that the
arbitrator is neutral. But if for some reason the arbitrator is biased against the class, the class
members have few ways to replace the biased arbitrator. The only remedies available are to (1)
complain to the very arbitrator they are accusing of bias or (2) seek an interlocutory appeal by
demonstrating that there was a manifest disregard of the law, neither of which seems very
promising.
156. Although the above text concentrates on the class members’ right to a neutral
arbitrator, defendant companies share that right as well. When an individual consumer and a
company mutually select an arbitrator, both parties are able to adequately protect themselves.
But what if the defendant would have chosen a different arbitrator with respect to other class
members? In such a case, the defendant company will be bound by the decision of an arbitrator
it played no role in selecting, which raises questions about class arbitration’s ability to
adequately protect the defendant. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that, because parties to an arbitration agreement are entitled to select their own
arbitrator, subjecting a defendant to the ruling of a single arbitrator with respect to every class
member’s claim is a violation of the defendant’s rights).
157. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing
absent class members to attack the adequacy of representation collaterally even after
termination of the suit), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam);
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973) (same). But see, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,
179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Simply put, the absent class members’ due process right to
adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court
initially . . . .”).
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prevents many class members from appealing the arbitrator’s initial
160
certification decision. Moreover, when the class representative’s
inadequacy becomes apparent after the certification decision, the
class members’ only available remedy is to appeal the arbitrator’s
final award. The manifest disregard of the law standard also precludes
many appeals challenging the class representative’s adequacy. As a
result, in class arbitration, class members can ensure adequate
representation only by objecting during the certification phase. This
result suggests that the adequacy of representation may present a
greater concern in class arbitration than in class action litigation.
Finally, many arbitration providers have yet to set forth any
161
provisions that safeguard the consumers’ due process rights. Despite
some shortcomings, JAMS’s class arbitration rules at least offer class
162
163
members adequate notice and opt-out rights. Other arbitration
providers, however, such as the National Arbitration Forum (NAF),
164
have no rules governing class arbitration. It is difficult to imagine
how a legislative response prohibiting use of class arbitration waivers
could succeed when some important arbitration providers have yet to
develop procedures which facilitate class arbitration.
3. The Availability of Class Arbitration May Lead Companies to
Avoid Using Arbitration Altogether. If Congress did amend the FAA
to prohibit use of class arbitration waivers, companies would be left
with a choice. They could continue to use arbitration agreements with
their consumers, subjecting themselves to potential class arbitration.
Or they could forgo use of arbitration agreements entirely, opting
instead to resolve disputes through traditional litigation and
therefore, when courts find certification appropriate, the traditional
class action. Section B assumes that companies would continue using
arbitration even in the absence of class arbitration waivers. This is a
questionable, and possibly erroneous, assumption. Class arbitration is
160. For a discussion of the manifest disregard of the law standard and its implications for
class arbitration, see supra notes 136–43 and accompanying text.
161. See Buckner, supra note 146, at 249 (noting that only AAA and JAMS have chosen to
provide due process-like protections to class members).
162. See JAMS, supra note 127, at 3 (mirroring Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and its notice provisions).
163. Id. (permitting class members to exclude themselves from the proceeding).
164. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 72. Professor Sternlight suggests that NAF actually uses
this fact to market itself to companies typically involved in consumer arbitration proceedings.
Id.
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a relatively new procedure, which, coupled with the fact that a
company rarely can appeal an arbitrator’s decision, suggests a high
165
degree of unpredictability.
Furthermore, some commentators
suggest that exposing companies to class arbitration would increase
the costs of resolving disputes when compared to the costs of
166
individual arbitration. At some point, companies may decide to
avoid arbitration altogether if the cost increases are significant, given
that a primary reason for arbitration is to avoid high litigation
167
expenditures. In light of these concerns, some companies have
amended their agreements to avoid arbitration altogether if they are
168
unable to compel arbitration on an individual basis.
For opponents of class waivers, this might seem like a favorable
result. Consumers would no longer be precluded from using
traditional litigation to resolve disputes. But Congress has declared a
169
national policy favoring arbitration. This national policy arose from
concerns that the legal system, characterized by high costs and
lengthy delays, was incapable of efficiently and adequately resolving
170
disputes. Arbitration and other alternative dispute mechanisms
171
Legislative action, by forcing
have helped ease this burden.
companies to engage in class arbitration, may very well force
countless consumer claims, many of which could have been
successfully resolved without exhausting limited judicial resources,
from arbitration to the courtroom. A successful solution to class
165. See id. at 118 (noting that companies may prefer “the known quantity of class action
litigation, rather than risk a bad experience with the relatively unknown” class arbitration
process).
166. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 100, at 90 (maintaining that arbitration and the clauses
typically included within arbitration agreements result in lower-priced consumer goods).
167. For an explanation of the reasons for widespread use of arbitration, see supra note 23
and accompanying text.
168. Jack Wilson, ‘No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,’ State-Law Unconscionability, and
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 779–80 (2004).
169. For a description of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA and the policy in
favor of arbitration, see supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
170. For the suggestion that litigation’s inefficiency gave rise to judicial acceptance of
arbitration, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
171. Raymond J. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64, 65
(1983) (“Although there is no readily available statistic concerning the time expended by judges
in handling pretrial conferences, and settlement conferences, the experience of our judges
indicates that the cases in the arbitration program, because of their early listing for the
arbitration hearing, consume far less pretrial judicial time than the cases that are not eligible for
arbitration.”).
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waivers should not compromise the federal policy favoring
arbitration.
IV. OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Note has demonstrated that a legislative response is not a
viable solution to class waivers because of the many fairness and
process problems associated with class arbitration. Highlighting
inadequacies of suggested reforms is of little use, however, if there are
no other potential solutions. In an oft-cited opinion, Justice Grodin of
the California Supreme Court acknowledged that class arbitration,
though an imperfect solution, “must be evaluated, not in relation to
172
some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.” Justice Grodin
concluded that when the alternative “is to force hundreds of
individual [consumers] each to litigate its cause . . . in a separate
arbitral forum, then the prospect of classwide arbitration, for all its
173
difficulties, may be a better, more efficient, and fairer solution.” But
allowing companies to avoid liability through use of class waivers is
not the only alternative to implementation of class arbitration.
Rather, other potential solutions exist. Congress could aim to lower
consumers’ arbitration costs by providing attorneys’ fees or shifting
costs onto businesses. Legislatures might also rely on administrative
enforcement to deter business misconduct. Finally, even if a majority
of jurisdictions choose not to adopt measures to protect consumers,
Congress should limit choice-of-law provisions to prevent businesses
from avoiding jurisdictions that do find class arbitration waivers
unconscionable. These and other solutions warrant further
examination by the legal community. This Part examines some of
these potential solutions.
A. Lower Individual Consumers’ Arbitration Costs
Class waivers make it nearly impossible for some consumers to
assert their claims. For low-value claimants, recovering an arbitral
award is economically unfeasible, after factoring in attorneys’ fees
and filing costs. The potential to aggregate claims might allow these
consumers to seek relief. Because consumers are precluded from

172. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), rev’d in part sub nom.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
173. Id.
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seeking relief due to the high costs and low returns of individual
arbitration, one potential solution is to lower those costs.
1. Attorneys’ Fees. Perhaps the easiest way to lower costs is to
require losing businesses to reimburse all of a claimant’s reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Though arbitration proceedings are informal,
designed to allow participants to resolve disputes without legal
counsel, complex consumer claims typically require an attorney’s
174
assistance. Low-value claimants are unlikely to seek relief when the
potential recovery is less than the attorney costs they must pay to
obtain that relief. Although requiring businesses to pay reasonable
attorneys’ fees would not entirely address the problems presented by
175
class waivers, it would partially offset the high costs that prevent
consumers from seeking relief.
To achieve this result, Congress could ban fee-waiver clauses in
176
arbitration agreements and allow the recovery of attorneys’ fees.
177
For instance, in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, the Third Circuit
held that an arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, in part
because the federal statute governing the consumer’s claim permitted
178
recovery of attorneys’ fees. If more consumer statutes permitted
such a recovery, then the costs of asserting a low-value claim would at
least partially be reduced. As a result, consumers would be more
likely to assert low-value claims on an individual basis.
2. Cost Shifting. Another way to lower consumers’ costs is to
shift some or all of the arbitration filing fees to the drafting party.
AAA’s rules require that consumers with claims lower than $10,000
are responsible for one half of the arbitrator’s fees, up to a maximum
of $125, and businesses are responsible for most of the remaining

174. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 81.
175. See id. (suggesting that even when attorneys’ fees are recoverable, few attorneys would
be willing to represent consumers with low-value claims).
176. This potential solution is certainly subject to the same critique offered earlier that
Congress is unlikely to pass any legislation to protect consumers. See supra Part III.A. But
because some consumer statutes already provide for attorneys’ fees, see, e.g., Truth-in-Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006) (allowing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees), perhaps this
legislative action is more likely.
177. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).
178. Id. at 374.
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179

costs. Though these rules are favorable to the consumer, they do not
help those with very small claims. For many consumers, the $125 fee
alone prevents filing a claim. As a result, the rules should provide
that, for consumers with low-value claims, the business must pay the
consumer’s fees. Under AAA’s rules, such a change would result in at
most a shift of only $125. And though this would raise the company’s
dispute-resolution costs, it seems unlikely that such a small shift in
fees would lead businesses to avoid using arbitration.
Unlike recovery of attorneys’ fees, however, cost shifting might
be a difficult solution to implement. Legislation appears doubtful
because the FAA likely would preempt any state statute requiring an
180
arbitration provider to shift fees. Therefore, consumers would likely
181
have to depend on courts to provide this type of relief. Courts could
make it a point to consider the fees imposed on the consumer
whenever arbitration agreements are challenged. The Supreme Court
182
suggested in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph that
when large arbitration costs preclude consumers from vindicating
their statutory rights in arbitration, the arbitration agreement should
183
be considered unenforceable. In making this determination, courts
could effectively require arbitration providers to shift the fees onto
businesses by invalidating any arbitration agreement that fails to
provide for such a shift in the case of low-value claimants. As courts
continue to invalidate agreements, many companies may voluntarily
begin to shift fees to themselves to continue use of arbitration.
Arbitration providers might also amend their rules to require such a
shift to retain as many disputes as possible.

179. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Costs (effective July 1, 2003),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22039.
180. For a brief explanation of the preemptive effect of the FAA, see supra notes 116–17
and accompanying text.
181. Because of this dependency, shifting costs may prove to be an inadequate solution.
Some courts might find that arbitration agreements failing to shift costs are unconscionable,
whereas others might refuse to invalidate these agreements. This result, which is very similar to
courts’ treatment of class arbitration waivers, would provide consumers little relief.
182. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
183. See id. at 90 (“It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude
a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”).
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B. Rely on Administrative Enforcement to Protect Consumers
Class arbitration waivers are problematic, not only for leaving
low-value claimants without adequate relief, but also because they
allow companies to avoid liability and continue detrimental and
184
possibly illegal activities. Because consumers are unable to assert
their claims, businesses are not held liable for their actions. As a
result, they continue their illegal actions, giving rise to yet more
consumer injuries. In addition to lowering consumer costs, one way
Congress could hold businesses accountable for their conduct is to
rely on administrative enforcement. Even if courts continue to uphold
class arbitration waivers, precluding many consumers from asserting
their claims, legislators can ensure that businesses are held liable—
and that their misconduct is hindered—by amending consumer
statutes to include administrative enforcement mechanisms.
185
For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) empowers the
Federal Trade Commission to enforce individual compliance with all
186
of TILA’s requirements. If a company violates TILA, its actions
could go unpunished in the absence of this enforcement mechanism,
because individual consumers might lack the financial incentives to
seek relief. But the Federal Trade Commission’s penalties serve as a
punishment, deterring violations of TILA. Courts have acknowledged
that administrative enforcement mechanisms reduce the concerns
187
accompanying class waivers. Federal agencies can impose penalties
to deter misconduct, even when private enforcement is unavailable
due to class waivers. The effect is not to provide consumers with relief
for their claims, though agency enforcement can include awards to
private parties; rather, administrative enforcement inhibits the
conduct giving rise to the consumers’ claims in the first place. If more
of the statutes concerning consumer arbitration proceedings contain
administrative enforcement mechanisms, more low-value claimants
will be able to seek relief.

184. For an explanation of the problems accompanying class arbitration waivers, see supra
Part I.B.
185. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2006).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c).
187. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement containing a class waiver clause because TILA’s provisions make public
enforcement available).
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C. Limit the Use of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Arbitration
Agreements
Even if the majority of courts continue to uphold class
arbitration waivers and legislatures elect not to take measures to
increase business accountability, Congress should consider limiting
the use of choice-of-law provisions to prevent businesses from
avoiding those jurisdictions that consider class waivers
unconscionable. Though the majority of courts generally consider
class waivers valid and enforceable, a growing number have begun to
188
scrutinize these waivers and their effect on consumers. The growing
support for consumer protection, however, even if it became support
among a majority of the American judiciary, would still be insufficient
to provide the relief called for by this Note because of use of choiceof-law provisions by corporations. Because American law treats
arbitration agreements as a contract between the drafting party and
189
the consumer, businesses are generally able to select the forum and
190
the applicable law that will govern any disputes. Businesses, aware
that some courts are critical of class waivers, have begun to
incorporate choice-of-law provisions within their arbitration
191
agreements to impose on consumers business-favorable laws. The
credit card industry, for instance, has successfully used choice-of-law
provisions to impose Delaware law on all consumers subject to the
192
industry’s arbitration agreements.
Thus, even if California
consumers have a colorable claim that a particular arbitration
agreement is unconscionable under California law, those consumers

188. For a summary of the various courts’ treatment of class waivers, see supra Part I.D.
189. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
190. Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005).
191. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1908–09 (2006) (evaluating
businesses’ attempts to project nationwide the law of certain states in all arbitration
agreements). Businesses also prefer to use choice-of-law clauses for efficiency reasons. Edward
Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration System: Choice and
Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, at
63, 74 (explaining that choice-of-law clauses are popular among contract drafters because they
“help to achieve simplicity in an overly complex legal and business world by restricting the
number of potentially applicable laws and thereby reducing the transaction costs of negotiating
and contracting”).
192. Nagareda, supra note 191, at 1909.
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might still be forced into arbitration if the company can successfully
apply another state’s unconscionability laws.
This is a troubling result because companies can continue to use
class waivers even if nearly every state’s laws hold that they are
unconscionable, so long as one state’s laws treat these clauses
favorably. The inclusion of choice-of-law provisions might therefore
negate any progress made by consumers in defeating class waivers. As
a result, absent national legislation precluding the use of class
waivers, consumer advocates must find a way to limit companies’
193
ability to use choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated over twenty-five years ago by Justice Grodin of
the California Supreme Court, class arbitration waivers have the
potential to significantly burden consumers seeking to hold businesses
194
liable for their misconduct.
Class waivers regularly preclude
consumers such as Gene Dale from obtaining relief. But imagine how
Dale’s story might have changed had Congress passed legislation
barring the use of class waivers in arbitration agreements, as
numerous commentators have called for. Dale and his fellow
subscribers could then have brought a class claim against Comcast in
an arbitration proceeding. Given the inadequacies of the class
arbitration rules, however, both the subscribers and Comcast would
sacrifice significant procedural protections. Discovery would be
limited, many of the parties involved would play little or no role in
selecting the arbitrator, and the consumers would have little chance of
obtaining judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. Or, in light of
these concerns, Comcast might instead have chosen to forgo
arbitration altogether. Although Dale and other subscribers would
then be free to file a class claim against Comcast, so too would
countless other consumers. Dale would almost certainly face years of
litigation before recovering his $10.56.
To some, these results might seem superior to the existing
situation, justifying a bar of class waivers. But if consumers deserve
meaningful protection from business misconduct, consumer advocates

193. But see Brunet, supra note 191, at 75 (maintaining that courts should enforce choice-oflaw clauses because they advance party autonomy).
194. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
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must shift their focus to new solutions. This Note has proposed three
solutions. First, courts, legislatures, or arbitration bodies could shift
attorneys’ fees and arbitration costs for consumers. Second,
legislatures could create administrative agencies to punish business
misconduct. Third, Congress should limit companies’ power to use
choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements. Unless scholars
examine these and other solutions, class waivers will continue to hurt
the Gene Dales of the world.

